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The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obli-
gation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, . . . [h]e may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed he should do so. But, while
he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It
is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods cal-
culated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.'
INTRODUCTION
There are many instances where defendants in criminal trials suffer
the (sometimes literally lethal) consequences of "foul blows" struck by
prosecutors improperly injecting explicit or implicit references to race or
gender bias into the jury's deliberations. Such improper use of race or
gender violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by an
impartial jury,2 the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
rights,3 and the defendant's right to a fair, unbiased trial under the Due
Process clause.4 Despite the constitutional stature of these violations, state
and federal courts are equivocal regarding the appropriate standard of
review and the ultimate disposition of cases where prosecutorial appeals
to prejudice are raised by the defendant on appeal.
This article proposes that direct or indirect references to the pro-
tected classes of race and/or gender should always be subject to the
Chapman v. California5 "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
Once the defendant has shown appeals to racial or gender bias in prose-
cutorial argument or other conduct during his trial, the burden must shift
to the prosecution to show at an immediate hearing outside the presence
of the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this impermissible appeal to
bias did not affect the fairness of the defendant's trial. Furthermore,
courts must take the examination of the prosecution's proof seriously,
1. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Steven D. DeBrota, Note, Arguments Appealing to
Racial Prejudice: Uncertainty, Impartiality, and the Harmless Error Doctrine, 64 IND. L.J. 375
(1989); See also Developments in the La--Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. Rev.
1472, 1588-95 (1988) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
5. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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and must recognize that even a single racially biased comment by a
prosecutor may improperly influence the outcome of a trial.
Part I reviews the current standards applied to allegations of prose-
cutorial misconduct. The cases gathered in Part II illustrate the need for
revising these standards. Part III suggests revisions of the doctrine and the
remedies provided under it. Part IV makes the policy arguments in sup-
port of these revisions.
I. USUAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR ALLEGATIONS OF
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
A. General Standard
Prosecutors' improper comments during a trial divide into two
types of error, constitutional and non-constitutional. On direct review in
the federal courts, "[t]he standard for determining if a non-constitutional
error is harmless ... is whether the error 'had substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' ,6 As the Supreme
7.Court described this standard in Kotteakos v. United States, it was meant
to deal with the perception that appellate courts "tower[ed] above the
trials of criminal cases as impregnable citadels of technicality.""
Before 1967, the Supreme Court applied a straight forward rule of
reversal when trial errors violated constitutional rights. 9 Chapman v.
California'0 changed the standard of review applied to constitutional errors
6. Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Harmless Error Review in the Second Circuit, 63 BROOK.
L. R-Ev. 395, 399 (1997) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946));
see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (discussing application of sub-
stantial prejudice standard).
7. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
8. Id. at 759 (citation omitted).
9. See David M. Skoglind, Harmless Constitutional Error: An Analysis of Its Current
Application, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 961, 961 (1981).
10. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). At the time the Chapman defendants were tried, the Califor-
nia constitution allowed the prosecutor to comment on the defendants' post-arrest
silence. The prosecutor took full advantage of this allowance at trial, "filling his argument
to the jury from beginning to end with numerous references to their silence and infer-
ences of their guilt resulting therefrom." Id. at 19. The Court stated that the defendants
had suffered a violation of the rights guaranteed to them by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 21. Although the defendants argued for a rule of automatic reversal,
the Court declined. The Court did conclude "that there may be some constitutional
errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that
they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring
the automatic reversal of the conviction." Id. at 22. Such language suggests that the Court
contemplated review of such cases occurring on a case-by-case basis, rather than by the
formation of "blanket rules" to address certain kinds of constitutional errors. The Court
recognized that "prior cases have indicated that there are some constitutional rights so
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by holding that a conviction could be upheld, in spite of certain
constitutional errors, under the "harmless error" doctrine.
If the error is a constitutional error, the degree of certainty
required on direct review before a court can declare it
harmless is heightened .... [I]f such an error is to be
deemed harmless 'the court must be able to declare a belief
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.''
If the court finds that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
the court may then affirm the conviction. Chapman recognized
exceptions to harmless error review for certain types of errors, the effects
of which the Court felt could not be easily identified or isolated,
including denial of counsel, judicial bias, or a coerced confession. 2 These
fundamental errors (as opposed to mere constitutional errors), under
Chapman, would continue to be treated under the pre-1967 automatic
reversal rule. The Chapman Court reasoned that under no circumstances
could these types of errors be harmless.
13
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure1 4 also governs
the review of trial errors on direct appeal in federal courts. Rule 52(a)
applies to errors to which timely objection was made at trial, and under
this rule the government bears the burden on direct review of showing
the absence of prejudice, regardless of whether the error is constitu-
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error .... Id. at
23. Importantly, the Court recognized (in dicta) that "constitutional error, in illegally
admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the
person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless." Id. at 24.
11. Walker, supra note 6, at 399 (citation omitted).
12. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8.
13. Breaking with precedent in 1991, the Supreme Court held in Arizona v. Fulmi-
nante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), that harmless error analysis does in fact apply to the
admission of coerced confessions at trial. See id. at 306-12 (demonstrating the trend of
applying the harmless error analysis more frequently and less stringently).
14. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52. The rule states:
Harmless Error and Plain Error.
(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
(b) Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
Id. To clarify, Rule 52(a) applies to the error where the defendant timely objected at
trial; Rule 52(b) applies to the error where the objection was forfeited. See United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993) (stating that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
52(b) "governs on appeal from criminal proceedings, provides a court of appeals a limited
power to correct errors that were forfeited because not timely raised in district court,"
and "defines a single category of forfeited-but-reversible error").
[VOL. 6:319
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tional.' s Rule 52(b) governs forfeited errors and "the defendant bears the
burden of proving that the error was not harmless.
'
'
6
Errors cited on habeas review are subject to a different standard of
review from errors challenged on direct appeal. On habeas review of a
constitutional error, the Supreme Court has adopted a harmless error
standard that one Second Circuit judge has stated is "less stringent than
that of the Chapman test.'
7
Before the court can utilize any harmless error analysis, the
defendant must satisfy the "cause and actual prejudice"
standard of United States v. Frady.' Under this test, defen-
dants must show "cause" which would excuse their failure
to appeal the error initially and "actual prejudice" which
occurred as a result.' 9 Once a defendant can satisfy the Frady
standard, a reviewing court must apply the test, set out by
the Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson,2 ° of whether
the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury's verdict."2' This is the same, lesser
standard the Court set forth in Kotteakos to be applied on
direct review of non-constitutional errors. But, if the re-
viewing court is in "grave doubt as to the harmlessness" of
a constitutional error, the petitioner wins.22 "Grave doubt"
occurs where "the matter is so evenly balanced that [the
judge] feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmless-
ness of the error.,
2 3
State courts do not necessarily apply the harmless error doctrine's
distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional errors.24 For
example, in Connecticut allegations of prosecutorial misconduct based
on the prosecutor's conduct during closing arguments is judged under a
Kotteakos-like standard. "In order to determine whether claims of prose-
cutorial misconduct amounted to a denial of due process, we must decide
15. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 731; see also Walker, supra note 6, at 399 (citing O'Neal v.
McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1995); Olano, 507 U.S. at 734).
16. Walker, supra note 6, at 400.
17. Id. at 400 (citing Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
18. 456 U.S. 152, 167-168 (1982).
19. Id. at 168.
20. 507 U.S. 619.
21. Id. at 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
22. O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 445 (1995).
23. Id. at 435 (quotation from Walker, supra note 6, at 400-401 (alterations in origi-
nal)).
24. But see State v. Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1238 (Haw. 1999) (applying harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt standard to allegations of racial remarks by prosecutor in
prosecutor's rebuttal argument).
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whether the challenged remarks were improper, and, if so, whether they
caused substantial prejudice to the defendant., 2' Thus, in states where
such a standard is applied, the defendant would have to show that the
outcome would have been different absent the improper comments.26
The application of a standard less stringent than Chapman by some state
courts adds to the problem of prosecutorial misconduct including racial
and gender bias. The lack of a clear constitutionally based standard means
that state reviewing courts need not adhere to any particular standard,
and thus are free to consider this sort of prosecutorial misconduct in any
way that they choose. This contributes to the disparate treatment of such
cases and absent clear guidelines, prosecutors may feel less constraint on
their behavior at trial.
B. The Standard of Review Specfically Governing Racial Bias
The Supreme Court has made it clear that racial prejudice should
never influence jury decisions. 21 In Rose v. Mitchell,28 the Court declared
that "[d]iscrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is espe-
cially pernicious in the administration of justice., 29 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in United States v. Doe30
subsequently equated references to nationality to references to race, as-
serting that distinctions based upon ancestry are as "odious" and
"suspect" as those predicated on race; in practical terms, appeals to either
threaten the fairness of a trial. 31 This prosecutorial conduct (which in Doe
25. State v. Garrett, 681 A.2d 362, 367 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (discussing allegations
of misconduct that included improper references to race) (citing State v. Oehman, 562
A.2d 493 (Conn. 1989)); see also People v. Johnston, 641 N.E.2d 898, 904 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) ("Improper remarks generally do not constitute reversible error unless they result
in substantial prejudice to the accused.") (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 680
N.E.2d 84, 89, 92 (Mass. 1997) (stating that in face of allegations of racially biased prose-
cutorial arguments, the court would "consider the prosecutor's argument as a whole" in
determining whether the allegations undermined the court's "faith in the fairness of the
jury's verdict").
26. See Johnston, 641 N.E.2d at 904-05.
27. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308-10 (1987).
28. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
29. Id. at 555; see also McFarland v. Smith 611 F.2d 414, 416-17 (2d Cir. 1979);
Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 706-07 (4th Cir. 1978); United States ex tel.
Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 156-59 (2d Cir. 1973).
30. 903 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
31. Id. at 21-22 (citations omitted). Several other courts have also reversed on the
grounds that references to race or ethnicity may be prejudicial. See United States v.
Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d 532, 540-43 (1st Cit. 1991) (using identification card to
suggest that defendant was Colombian, and thus was likely to participate in conspiracy
with another Colombian, could be taken as an appeal to find defendant guilty by reason
of his national origin; court reversed on ground that the trial court's admission of Co-
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included presentation of prejudicial testimony as well as argument) 32
violates a defendant's due process and equal protection rights. Since it is
constitutional error, the burden of showing it harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt should fall on the prosecution under the rule in Chapman.
If previous cases established that injecting prejudice into a trial re-
sulted in a miscarriage of justice, Doe clarified how the court should
determine when prosecutorial references to race or nationality have
prejudiced a jury decision. In Doe, the court held that prosecutorial ref-
erences to the Jamaican birth/citizenship of a defendant were not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for two reasons: first, the other
evidence against the defendant was hardly overwhelming (in fact, the first
jury was hung-this was a second trial). Second, while it is difficult to
weigh the impact of racial remarks, their harm may be extreme.33 Before
coming to this conclusion, the court also responded to an argument in
the prosecutor's brief that the remarks were "fleeting" or "insignificant"
by noting a total of three references to race or nationality in the summa-
tion.
34
The Doe court's analysis has been fashioned by other courts into a
standard to determine if racial or nationalist comments are harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. These courts have interpreted Doe to weigh
the frequency of prosecutorial references to race or nationality; the
emphasis placed on these remarks by the prosecutor, or their overall
significance to her argument; and the weight of all the other evidence
lombian ID card was abuse of discretion, but found that prosecutor's use of card, though
exploitative of prejudice, was not prosecutorial misconduct, given that the trial court had
admitted the card as evidence); People v. Bahoda, 202 Mich. App. 214, 216-17 (1993)
(finding that reference to defendant's Iraqi nationality, and "Arab connection" during the
Persian Gulf war was improper as part of reversible error); Guerra v. Collins, 916 F. Supp
620, 629-30 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (discussing among several prejudicial factors witness's use
of "wetbacks" and statement that "Mexicans only come to the United States to commit
crimes and take jobs away from United States citizens" illustrated her prejudice). But see
United States v. Hemandez, 865 F.2d 925, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that stating
"send a message to Cuban drug dealers" is not harmful); United States v. Home, 423
F.2d 630, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding question by prosecutor asking if defense was
"trying to let these people hide behind their race" unobjectionable).
32. Doe, 903 F.2d at 18-20.
33. "Appeals to racial passion can distort the search for truth and drastically affect a
juror's impartiality." Doe, 903 F.2d at 25. In Doe, the court also excluded references to an
expert witness's testimony that local drug dealers were in many cases being replaced by
Jamaicans, and "strongly suggested that appellants were guilty because two of them are
Jamaican." Id. at 20. The evidence was deemed irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 402. See id. The court also found these statements more prejudicial than probative
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Id. at 21.
34. Id. at 26. The court made these observations in the course of its exposition and
analysis of the prosecutor's summation, not in the section in which it evaluated the
prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's statements.
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presented against the defendant at trial. 3' Almost no courts reference the
Doe court's concern for the uncertain but overwhelming prejudice such
remarks inject into the trial.36 Most courts have therefore refused to find
these comments prejudicial, because they identify the comments as
"isolated."
C. The Standard of Review Specifically Governing Gender Bias
Commentators suggest that gender bias permeates the trial structure
and process.37 Courts include gender or sex in their lists of impermissible• 38
biases, yet cases where female defendants have raised prosecutorial mis-
conduct claims based on gender bias are a null set. In one case, Ballard v.
United States,39 the Court addressed gender discrimination at trial in the
context of selecting grand and petit juries.40 The Court held that "[t]he
systematic and intentional exclusion of women, like the exclusion of a
racial group, ... or an economic or social class, ... deprives the jury
system of the broad base it was designed by Congress to have in our
democratic society. ' ' 4' The Court broadly stated that the gender-based
exclusion considered in this case causes an injury that "is not limited to
the defendant-there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an insti-
tution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected
35. See, e.g., Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 663-64 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Rodriguez, 949 F.2d 532, 540-43 (1st Cir. 1991).
36. But see Commonwealth v. Kines, 640 N.E.2d 1117, 1118-19 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994). The prosecutor's suggestion that the Black defendant resisted arrest because of
contempt for the White police officer was reversible error, even though the prosecutor
only made one mention of race. Even though the judge gave a corrective instruction, in
light of the fact that there was another prosecutorial error in the case, the injection of a
racial issue into the case was not harmless.
37. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. Rav. 477
(1996); Judge Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Permeation of Race, National Origin and Gender Issues
from Initial Law Enforcement Contact Through Sentencing: The Need for Sensitivity, Equalitari-
anism and Vigilance in the Criminal Justice System, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1153 (1994).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 865 F.2d 925, 928 n.2 (1989). The court's
instruction states that the jury "should not be influenced [in its deliberations] by a per-
son's race, color, religion, national ancestry or sex." Id.
39. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
40. The Court did not find the exclusion of women to be a due process violation
affecting the trial process, but rather simply a misunderstanding of the applicable legal
standards. See id. at 199-200. The Court held that, based on the state law of California
making women eligible for jury duty, and on the federal policy of juries reflecting a
cross-section of the community, excluding women from the juries in this case was im-
proper and reversible error. See id. at 193.
41. Id. at 195; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (intentional
discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors in use of peremptory challenges
during jury selection violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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in the processes of our courts., 42 While Ballard and subsequent cases do
not clarify exactly which standards apply to claims of gender bias at trial,
they do suggest that standards similar or equivalent to those applied to
race should prevail.
II. WHY THE STANDARDS NEED TO CHANGE: DEPLORABLE
INSTANCES OF PROSECUTORIAL APPEALS TO BIAS4 3
It may be the "new millennium," but that might not be apparent
when looking at the following cases as examples of current social con-
sciousness regarding racism in America. One of the challenges of
remedying prosecutorial racism at trial is dealing with a "cold record" at
the appellate stage that often fails to provide detail, not to mention con-
text, regarding the circumstances of the claim. These cases are shocking
enough on the cold record, however, to raise serious doubts about what.
actually occurs in trial courts across the country. Yet courts rarely over-
turn on grounds of racial bias, instead they weigh the statements against
other evidence; simply count the number of racial references; attempt to
assert the relevance of the remarks; or explain away their racism.
A. Explaining Away Remarks
Some courts go to great lengths to justify the racial remarks of
prosecutors as relevant or not clearly racial. 44 In Smith v Farley,"5 the Sev-
enth Circuit, finding no racism in the prosecutor's comments, said that it
was not clear the prosecutor's references to "shucking and jiving" re-
garding a Black witness on the stand, and to "Superfly" regarding the
Black defendant, would have been significant to a White jury. In fact,
the court held, these references could have been based on "cross-over
terms," like "badmouth," accepted as a natural and racially neutral part of
42. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195.
43. The following case discussion highlights some of the more shocking instances of
prosecutorial racial bias that is available in the case law. For a very useful survey of case
law in this area, see Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Prosecutor's Appeal in Criminal Case to
Racial, National, or Religious Prejudice as Ground for Mistrial, New Trial, Reversal, or Vacation
of Sentence-Modern Cases, 70 A.L.R.4th 664 (1989 & Supp. 2000).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239, 1243-44 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding
no error in referring to defendants by street name "Jamaicans" because it linked defen-
dants as members of drug conspiracy; also noting that "the court had difficulty
understanding several witnesses, including Beckford, who were Jamaican and spoke
Jamaican patois which Beckford described as 'broken' English"); United States v. Santi-
ago, 46 F.3d 885, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding reference to the Mexican mafia
acceptable under plain error review as long as the argument was a "dispassionate and
intelligent presentation of the evidence").
45. 59 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1995).
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speech.46 Even more troubling, the court engaged in case counting, and
concluded that while race is a very important issue, only one case had
47been overturned on these grounds in the last 15 years.
In People v. Johnson,4 8 the Black defendant stood trial for robbing a
White man of a gold necklace by ripping it off the man's neck on the
sidewalk in North Lincoln Park, in front of the victim's family. The
Illinois appeals court considering the case described the alleged bias:
Defendant contends that the prosecutor attempted to
arouse the jury's antagonism and to incite racial prejudice
against him by pointing out that defendant, who is African
American, lived on the south side of Chicago and that the
crime occurred a substantial distance away from defendant's
home, in North Lincoln Park; and by stating that there was
"no reason for him to be there except to cause trouble, to
look for some victim." The prosecutor concluded with the
statement, "you decide whether to protect your streets,
your community from [the defendant]. 49
The defendant in Johnson objected to such statements in his appeal,
arguing that the prosecutor was at least implying that "'a public park on
the north side of Chicago is or should be off limits to a black man from
the south side of Chicago,' and that urging the jury to protect 'their'
community was an appeal to the juror's racial bias." ' The court failed,
however, to find that this bias was an improper appeal to racial prejudice
at all. The court held that it was "not improper for the State to comment
unfavorably upon the defendant or to urge the fearless administration of
the law."' 1
In State v. Richmond,52 the Kansas Supreme Court attempted to assert
the relevancy of racial statements at the same time that it found them im-
proper. Richmond-a Black man-was convicted of a brutal assault and
rape committed during a home invasion robbery. 3 The victim, a wife and
mother, was White. During his closing remarks, the prosecutor stated to
the jury, "'[t]hink about having to divulge to your husband that you were
raped by a black male. Think about having to divulge that information to
law enforcement officers.' 'Both of the females are white-Both of the
46. Id. at 664.
47. Id. at 663 (citing United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
48. 581 N.E.2d 118 (1IH. App. Ct. 1991).
49. Id. at 126.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 127.
52. 904 P.2d 974 (Kan. 1995).
53. Id. at 976, 977.
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victims [of two separate crimes discussed at trial were] white females
. " The court's evaluation of these comments strains credulity:
The prosecutor's point was that [the victim] may have un-
derstated the circumstances when speaking to her husband
and law enforcement officers, from concern for her hus-
band's feelings about his wife's being sexually assaulted by
another man .... Because the prosecutor named the race
of the rapist in connection with the victim's telling her
husband, there is the further suggestion that his wife's being
raped by a black man likely would provoke a more negative
reaction from the husband than her being raped by a white
55
man.
In short, the court failed to overturn Richmond's conviction, find-
ing the remarks "improper" while noting that Richmond's attorney did
not object to them at trial 6
Compare Richmond to State v. Reynolds.17 In Reynolds, the Florida
District Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction for sexual
battery on the basis of the prosecutor's improper racial comments. The
defendant, a Black man, was accused of sexually assaulting a White
woman in her apartment. The prosecutor said things throughout the trial
that "suggest[ed] that white women are not safe from Reynolds and that
consensual relations between a white woman and a black man are not
allowed .... The court quoted the prosecutor in its opinion regarding
voir dire when the prosecutor asked the White jurors, "'[a]re there any
of you who have either dated, married, had any kind of relationship with
a person of the black race? . .. Are there any of you who have a child or
relation who has been or is in those circumstances?' "'; in the prosecu-
tor's opening statement, he said "this black man standing in her
apartment when she came down the hall, he told her he had a gun
.... ,,60; while examining the victim, and cross-examining the defendant,
the prosecutor asked whether either of them had ever dated or had con-
sensual relations with "a black boy or black man" or a "white girl" 61; and
finally, during closing arguments, the prosecutor said,
54. Id. at 983 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 984.
56. Id.
57. 580 So.2d 254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
58. Id. at 255.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 256.
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"Ladies and gentlemen, the question is not whether he had
a gun, but whether [the victim] feared John Reynolds,
whether she feared a black man who had appeared in her
apartment without her invitation .... I want you to think
about how embarrassing it is for an 18-year-old white girl
from Crestview to admit she was raped by a black man. It is
humiliating."
62
These comments are very similar to the comments made by the prose-
cutor in Richmond (although there were fewer of them); yet in Reynolds
the court reversed Reynolds' conviction and remanded for a new trial.
In State v. Blanks63 the Iowa Court of Appeals also reversed a finding
of guilt based on the prosecutor's racial statements. The prosecutor used
the movie Gorillas in the Mist as an analogy in his closing argument, in
reference to the defendant's alleged crime and the surrounding events.
The prosecutor later asserted that he "was trying to suggest only humans,
unlike gorillas, must be subject to a rule of law., 64 The state charged the
Black defendant with attacking and beating his White girlfriend during a
party with a group of the defendant's Black friends. The court identified
two problems with the analogy: the parallels between the case at hand
and the fact that in the movie the lead character, a White woman, is
brutally murdered by a group of Black poachers. 6' The second problem
was the prosecutor's reference to the defendant and his friends as apes
and animals.66 The court recognized that the jury could have interpreted
these references as racial slurs, and thus reversed the defendant's convic-
tion and remanded the case for a new trial.67
B. Weighing Evidence of Guilt Against Evidence of Bias
Courts are more reluctant to find racial remarks have prejudiced a
trial when the court believes other evidence weighs heavily against the
defendant. In Darden v. Wainwright,68 the Court refused to reverse, even
though at every level of appeal, courts recognized the racism of the
prosecutor's statements. Darden, a Black man, was tried, sentenced to
death, and ultimately executed for the murder of a furniture store owner
in an armed robbery. The crime was brutal; the perpetrator shot and
killed the store owner, and then shot a 16-year-old part time store em-
62. Id.
63. 479 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
64. Id. at 602.
65. Id. at 604, 605.
66. Id. at 603.
67. Id. at 605.
68. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
Setting the Record Straight
ployee three times. The assailant also ordered the store owner's wife to
perform oral sex on him, after he had shot her husband who lay dying in
the rain. While thwarted in his attempted sexual assault, the assailant left
the crime scene and crashed his green Chevy into a telephone pole.
69
Darden's appeals, ending in the United States Supreme Court, ar-
gued that the prosecutor's improper comments during the closing
argument of the guilt phase of the trial rendered his conviction funda-
mentally unfair and his death sentence constitutionally unsound under
the Eighth Amendment. 70 The Supreme Court's opinion acknowledges
that the prosecutor had been widely lambasted for the content of his
argument: "That argument deserves the condemnation it has received
from every court to review it, although no court has held that the argu-
ment rendered the trial unfair.",7' The dissenting opinion of Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, fleshes out
the details of the prosecutor's comments. The prosecutor repeatedly
referred to Darden as a "prisoner on furlough who 'shouldn't be out of
his cell unless he has a leash on him.' ,72 The prosecutor coupled these
references with the comment that "[a]s far as [the prosecutor himself is]
concerned . .. this man this person, as an animal, this animal was on the
public for one reason., 73 The dissenters' views on the effects of these
comments is demonstrated by their agreement with the Magistrate Judge
in the case, who wrote that the remarks in question arose "'[i]n the
context of the emotionally charged trial of Darden, a black man, accused
of robbery, the brutal murder of a white man, the repeated shooting of a
defenseless white teenager and vile sexual advances on a white woman.,
74
Nevertheless, the majority, arguing the totality of the evidence and cir-
cumstances, held that the prosecutor's arguments did not unfairly bias
Darden's conviction and sentence. This case in many ways highlights the
pressures faced by a court when issues of race or gender bias arise. The
Court noted that "[t]he weight of the evidence against the petitioner was
heavy; [there was] 'overwhelming eyewitness and circumstantial evidence
to support a finding of guilt on all charges' .. .,75 The facts of the crime
were exceedingly brutal, and the Court declined to find that the prose-
cutor's comments made the trial or its outcome "fundamentally unfair.,
76
69. Id. at 171-173.
70. Id. at 178-79.
71. Id. at 179; see also id. at 189-90 (listing other sources of condemnation for the
prosecutors actions, including the Florida Supreme Court's opinion, the opinion of the
Middle District of Florida, and the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit).
72. Id. at 192.
73. Id. at 182.
74. Id. at 190 n.2.
75. Id. at 182.
76. Id. at 183.
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C. Finding Racial Remarks Isolated
In countless cases, courts contend that "isolated" racial refer-
ences are not grounds for reversal. 77 For instance, in People v.
Cudjo,7 9 the defendant's attorney presented a consent defense to the
charge of rape against his client. The prosecutor, in his closing argument,
made the following rebuttal of that defense:
And what [defendant] wants you to believe, and what I be-
lieve to be perhaps the most telling thing in this whole case,
is that this woman who, from all appearances is a happily
married mother of three trying to make ends meet living
out there where they can have a house they can afford,
taking in sewing to help meet the family budget, keeping
that kind of a house, that this woman is going to have in-
tercourse with a strange man-frankly any man-a black
man, on her living room couch with her five-year-old in
the house7 9
The California Supreme Court, despite recognizing that prosecuto-
rial argument appealing to racial prejudice "violates the due process and
equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
Constitution, "8' refused to find that this statement prejudiced the defen-
dant.8 '
Cases where courts have failed to overturn convictions in the face
of prosecutorial misconduct based on racial bias vastly outnumber cases
77. See, e.g., Russell v. Collins, 944 F.2d 202, 204 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991). The Collins
court probed the prosecutor's statement that civil rights of victims should be given more
weight and civil rights of defendants less weight in criminal cases. The court also dis-
cussed the prosecutor asking the jury to imagine the fear of the victim (who was White)
as the prisoner of three Black strangers, one of whom had a gun. The court refused the
appellant's habeas petition in part because one improper reference to race in the prose-
cutor's argument is "isolated". Id. at 204, n.1. See also, e.g., People v. Espinal, 572
N.Y.S.2d 334 (App. Div. 1991) (discussing prosecutor's reference to fact that store where
defendant was employed was owned by persons from Dominican Republic, and holding
that these references were not numerous, did not urge jury to judge credibility of witness
based on nationality, and were therefore harmless); State v. Poole, 688 N.E.2d 591, 598
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (discussing prosecutor's use of different method of cross examining
Black witness and other witnesses, specifically, referring to the Black witness's drug habit
and talking in a mocking tone of voice, but disagreeing with the defense that this was
racially demeaning or discriminatory, in the context of the entire trial).
78. 863 P.2d 635 (Cal. 1993).
79. Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
80. Id. (citing United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
81. Id.
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where convictions have been overturned.8 2 Cases with extremely similar
fact patterns fall into both categories, highlighting the judiciary's confu-
sion as to how the harmless error doctrine should apply to prejudicial
prosecutorial misconduct.
III. A REMEDY FOR PREJUDICIAL REMARKS
The commonly employed current standard, like that enunciated in
Doe, does not adequately address racial, gender, or ethnic prejudice in-
jected into trials by prosecutorial misconduct. Instead of evaluating
prejudicial statements in light of all other evidence in a trial, courts could
fashion a Batson-style remedy that permits a court to respond immedi-
ately to such remarks, upon an objection of counsel, if the court finds
them to be prejudicial."' Defense attorneys should be able to offer the
objection that a remark is prejudicial under Doe, then be able to immedi-
ately argue a prima facie case for prejudice. In response, the judge should
hold an immediate hearing outside the presence of the jury to decide
whether or not a comment was prejudicial. At this hearing, the judge
may inquire of the prosecutor his justification for the remark, request
clarification of the nature of the objection from the defense, or accept
any other evidence it finds helpful. Should the judge find the remark
prejudicial, she should decide on the necessary remedy: to strike the
remark and offer a curative instruction, or to declare an immediate
82. The discussion in Part II is limited to claims of racial bias, as a thorough search of
case law has failed to turn up claims brought by female defendants of explicit gender bias
by prosecutors. A small number of male defendants have raised claims of gender bias in
the exercise of prosecutors' discretion whether to bring charges against particular offend-
ers. See, e.g., Carruthers v. State, No. $99P1418, 2000 WL 257773 (Ga. Mar. 6, 2000).
83. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The court stated that in order to
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination injury selection,
[a] defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to
remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the
defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dis-
pute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that
permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." Fi-
nally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to
exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.
Id. at 96. This combination of factors "raises the necessary inference of purposeful dis-
crimination." Id. (citations omitted). See also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 476
(1990) (finding that White defendants had standing to challenge the exclusion of Black
jurors through peremptory challenges under Batson).
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84mistrial. While many have criticized the remedy, absent any opportu-
nity to make a full record, a reviewing court is left with a remark,
propounded question, or elicited testimony that can later be garnished
with an "innocent" explanation. The fact that reviewing courts do not
have a stringent standard for Batson challenges does not mean that they
should not.
Also, while the Batson-type remedy suggested here invites com-
parisons to the lack of efficacy of Batson challenges, it is important to
remember that Batson looks to an act which is of necessity a subjective
and discretionary one-the exercise of peremptory challenges. Using the
same tool in this context should be quite different. When, for example,
like in the Doe case, a prosecutor prosecuting against a Jamaican defen-
dant charged with drug trafficking chooses to elicit testimony about how
"Jamaicans" have taken over the city with drug gangs in the wake of
much publicity about that very subject, and then emphasizes the same
appeal to prejudice in his or her argument to the jury, this remedy would
require much more of the prosecutor. He or she would have to explain
how the testimony was relevant"' and how it met the more probative
than prejudicial standard, 6 not merely satisfy the judge that he or she had
some articulable reason, other than racism, for making the remark or
eliciting the testimony.
In deciding whether to declare a mistrial, courts should be mindful
of the Doe court's observation that prejudice may be difficult to meas-
ure.8 7 Although many courts have subsequently relied on the number of
prejudicial references made by a prosecutor, the Doe court did not iden-
tify this or any other easy resolution to the uncertainty of prejudice.
Because prosecutors are in the best position to avoid such prejudice, they
should bear the burden of the uncertainty he or she has injected into the
trial. The courts can place this burden on prosecutors by ordering a
mistrial. Better that the prosecutor should bear the burden of his or her
84. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Reme-
dies, 77 WAsH.U. L.Q. 713 (1999).
If the Supreme Court permits questioning of prosecutors about subjec-
tive intent, it will be difficult for lower courts to reject responses as
untrue, regardless of whether they appear contrived or as a post hoc ra-
tionalization. Indeed, the exception to this analysis, Batson, proves the
folly of permitting judicial inquiry into the prosecutor's reasons for act-
ing. In evaluating the proffered justification for a peremptory challenge,
the Court stated that assessing the constitutionality of the attorney's con-
duct "does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even
plausible."
Id. at 724 (citation onitted).
85. See Fed. R. Evid. 402.
86. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403.
87. United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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own actions, than that the defendant should bear it via a conviction
tainted by prejudice.
IV. POLICY REASONS FOR REFORM
A prosecutor's role is symbolic: she serves not just as an adversary,
but as a representative of the people. Her influence over the jury is cer-
tainly significant, though it is difficult to measure, just as it is difficult to
measure the impact of prejudice injected by her into a trial. Prosecutors
may make permissible references to race, particularly as they pertain to
motive in, for example, hate crimes. As a result, courts face a tremendous
challenge in their attempts to discern and evaluate the impact of particu-
lar instances of prosecutorial prejudice. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
is clear that there is no place for race, ethnicity, or gender prejudice in
the criminal justice system. 88 The credibility of the justice system is on
the line, and thus courts need to identify procedures for determining
whether the argument appeals to improper prejudice and then determine
what to do about it.
As a representative of the state, the prosecutor's primary responsi-
bility is to the administration of justice, not just winning cases.89 The
prosecutor decides when to pursue and when to drop cases, and pre-
sumably is uniquely privy to information about the merits of a case.
Because of her unique position, juries invest the prosecutor with author-
ity beyond that of an advocate, and the prosecutor must be accountable
for that authority.9° Unfortunately, such accountability is not exacted via
the prosecutor's supervisors or bar associations; one author noted that
such organizations took no measures in response to any of the hundreds
of instances of misconduct he documented. 9' The courts provide the
88. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 84-85; McKlesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310
(citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880)); see also Rose v. Mitchell,
443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979); 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1994).
89. See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework,
15 AMJ. CIM. L. 197, 198 (1988).
90. The Doe court observed that there exists "'the possibility that the jury will give
special weight to the prosecutor's arguments, not only because of the prestige associated
with his office, but also because of the fact-finding facilities presumably available to
him[sic].' Just how much influence the prosecutor's summation exerted upon the jury is,
of course, incapable of precise measurement, but its portent for harm is ominous." Doe,
903 F.2d at 28.
91. See Bennett L. Gershman, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, 13-2 n.4 (6th ed.
1991); see also Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Death Row Justice Derailed; Bias, Errors and
Incompetence in Capital Cases Have Turned Illinois' Harshest Punishment into its Least Credible
(pt. 1), CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at Al; Steve Mills & Kenn Armstrong, Inept Defenses
Cloud Verdicts; With Theirs Lives at Stake, Defendants in Illinois Capital Trials Need the Best
Attorneys Available, but They Often Get Some of the Worst (.pt. 2), CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15,
1999, at Al; Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, The Inside Informant (pt. 3), CHI. TRIB., Nov.
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primary restraint on prosecutorial misconduct. Courts therefor must be
equipped with the tools to identify, record, and remedy the injection of
prejudice by the prosecutor into criminal proceedings. 92
Providing a hearing at the moment a comment is introduced is one
means of assisting courts in the identification of prejudice, a task that is
becoming increasingly difficult as prejudice becomes more subtle.93 Ac-
cording to one observer, "[a]s American society has matured, blatant
forms of racism have increasingly been replaced by newer, more elusive,
but equally injurious forms of derision . . . 'modem prejudice is subtle,
[and] modem forms of racial discrimination are typically indirect and
ostensibly non-racial.' ,94 While case transcripts from the 1990's show
that blatant racism has hardly disappeared, 9s in many cases a court's scru-
tiny of potentially prejudicial remarks must be more refined than it once
was.9 6 Analyzing suspect comments at the time they are made enables
counsel to provide not only context but also perspective on the potential
implications of such statements. In cases where the prosecutor herself is
unaware of the implications of her statements, or careless about their
16, 1999, at Al; Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, A Tortured Path to Death Row (pt. 4), CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 17, 1999, at Al; Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Convicted by a Hair (pt. 5),
CHICAGo TRIB., Nov. 18, 1999, at Al.
92. See Commonwealth v. Kines, 640 N.E. 2d 1117, 1118-20 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994) (BrownJ. concurring) (1994).
If prosecutors do not see the light, they must be made to feel the
heat.... [T]he only way to bring about carefully prepared and proper
closing arguments and to stop the abuse is to reverse summarily .... It
still is my hope that ultimately a prosecutor whose misconduct is flagrant
will be required personally to reimburse the Commonwealth for the
costs of any resultant retrial.
Id.
93. See V.A. Pichelle, Racism as a Strategic Tool at Trial: Appealing Race-Based Prosecu-
torial Misconduct, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2357 (1993). One commentator suggests that racism
resides in the unconscious, thus increasing the subtlety and unawareness with which
people practice racism. See Charles R. Lawrence 1II, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 323-24 (1987) (arguing that the
law must come to grips with "unconscious racism" in order to filly meet the goals of the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantees).
94. Elizabeth L. Earle, Banishing the Thirteenth Juror: An Approach to the Identification of
Prosecutorial Racism, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1222 (1992) (quoting Thomas F. Petti-
grew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 PUTGERS L. REV.
673, 694 (1985)).
95. See supra Part II.
96. One example of indirect, though hardly subtle, racial statements are those em-
ployed by Officer Koon, when testifying about his beating of Rodney King. Koon stated
that King "gave out a bear-like yell" and "groaned like a wounded animal," dehumaniz-
ing King, as Blacks have historically been dehumanized and animalized in order to justify
their subjugation to brutality. Sergeant Says King Appeared to Be on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1992, at A20.
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impact on the jury, it is even more important to employ procedures to
illuminate the harmful nature of her remarks and to enable the court to
articulate what would otherwise remain latent prejudice.
Once courts have identified a remark as prejudicial, they must still
weigh the impact of the remark on the jury. Jury members themselves
may not be conscious of the prejudices they hold and the statements that
trigger those prejudices. Understanding the force of such statements
becomes even more difficult on review, when the appellate court cannot
hear the inflections of the prosecutor or take in the influence of such
remarks at the juncture in the trial at which they are offered.9"
These complexities suggest that observation of the jury or simple
counting of prosecutorial trial statements that may spark prejudice is not
sufficient. In these cases the court's analysis is necessarily speculative, and
should encompass the range of potential effects such statements may have
on the jury. This analysis must be facilitated by an immediate hearing, in
order to ensure that all available considerations are raised for and consid-
ered by the court. Defense counsel will have the opportunity to
articulate the nature of the case at the moment the statement is made and
to make clear likely effects of such statements on the jury. Immediate
hearings will also preserve a record for review more extensive than the
statements themselves, permitting appellate courts to consider the sub-
stance of the remarks more fully and provide further checks against
prejudice.
Allowing for an immediate hearing is in fact a fairly conservative
solution, in light of the severity of the error. One commentator contends
that assessing the impact of racial statements on a jury is so difficult that
once a racial statement is identified, the court can never determine that
its impact was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, a court
should grant an automatic mistrial due to the uncertainty injected into
the proceedings.99 As another commentator puts it, "there is no such
thing as a harmless constitutional error."' ° Courts should be careful not
to underestimate the weight of prejudicial statements. This is particularly
possible when courts attempt to balance the weight of these statements
against all the other evidence presented at a trial.
This balancing may shift the emphasis of the examination from the
fairness of the proceeding to the guilt of defendant. 1 While contextual-
izing the potentially prejudicial statement is important, the uncertainty of
97. See Lawrence, supra note 93, at 323-24.
98. See Earle, supra note 94, at 1229.
99. See DeBrota, supra note 4, at 378.
100. James Edward Wicht 1II, There is No Such Thing as a Harmless Constitutional Error:
Returning to a Rule of Automatic Reversal, 12 BYUJ. PUB. L. 73 (1997).
101. Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due Process:
There's More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L REv. 1298, 1321 (1988).
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any evaluation and the significance of the rights at stake suggest that
courts should err on the side of caution in their choice of remedy.
This is not to say that prosecutors may never resort to racially-based
arguments. When prosecuting racially-motivated hate crimes, for in-
stance, the motive of the perpetrator is an essential component of the
crime. 10 2 Moreover, critical race theorists like Derrick Bell and Patricia
Williams argue that accounts of racial experience and viewpoint must be
explicitly injected into legal proceedings, because these accounts are
implicit in how Americans view their world. 103 Such devices must obvi-
ously be handled with care, however, and requiring an immediate
hearing to determine when and how racial statements may be invoked in
the courtroom will help ensure that the courts take such care.
CONCLUSION
The costs of prosecutorial appeals to race and or gender bias are
enormous; in a society as deeply divided over the effects of bias in our
criminal justice system as this one is, failure to address this sort of prose-
cutorial misconduct will allow confidence in the criminal justice system
to continue to erode. Many minorities feel that there is one system for
the majority and another more onerous one for them. Requiring a
prosecutor to state-immediately at the time of the comment or elicita-
tion of evidence which appeals to race or gender bias-his or her
reasons, will force a consciousness on the court, the prosecution and the
defense that is sorely needed.
"If prosecutors are permitted to convict guilty defendants by im-
proper, unfair means, then we are but a moment away from the time
when prosecutors will convict innocent defendants by unfair means.,104
102. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157 (1999).
103. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1992); PATRICIA
J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY Or RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
104. State v. Torres, 554 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
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